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*     *     *     *     * 
Editor’s Note: This article is the first part of a conversation which is continued in 
the article entitled Conversation on Paul Oslington’s Deus Economicus in this 
same issue of AEJT.  
 
*     *     *     *     * 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in religion among 
economists, but the content of religion has so far been neglected. This paper 
builds a rational choice model of divine action, in particular of the structure of 
the divine offer of salvation and rational human response. It considers why 
God might not save everyone, the pattern of salvation across individuals with 
different preferences and endowments, and the way religious conversion and 
revivals are often large and sudden changes. Rational choice analysis of 
divine human interactions is a contribution to the renewal interdisciplinary 
conversation between economists and religion scholars.  
 
*     *     *     *     * 
1) INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in religion among 
economists.  Religion is clearly important - Iannaccone (1998 pp1468-69) points 
out that 95% of Americans believe in God, and 60% are members of a church,  
church contributions are around 1% of GDP, and clergy employment is around 
1.2% of the population. Less easily measured but probably more important are 
religious influences on other employment and consumption decisions.  The 
growing economics of religion literature has shed light on many aspects of 
religion, including the allocation of time to religious activities (Azzi and 
Ehrenberg 1975; Iannaccone 1990), the organisation of churches (Iannaccone 
1992; Ekelund Hebert and Tollison  2002,), free will and predestination (Allen 
2000), and the afterlife (Smith 1999; 2002),  
 
In the economics literature a major gap is modelling the content of religion, 
especially divine action (as noted by Iannaccone 1998 p1490, and Brennan and 
Waterman 1994 p 174-5, and Britton and Sedgwick (2003)).  If rational choice 
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tools of economics are as general and powerful as is claimed (for instance 
Becker 1976 ch 1) then they should apply equally to divine as well as human 
action.  To put it another way, any God an economist would take seriously must 
be rational in the economists’ sense, or at least be able to be modelled this way. 
 If anything  God should be more rational than humans -  the perfection of 
rationality.  
 
The only work in the economics literature along these lines is Brams (1980; 
1983) modelling of divine-human interactions using game theory.  Brams 
believes economic theory “provides a powerful tool for clarifying key theological 
concepts”  (1983 pvii), and aims to demonstrate this by applying game theoretic 
tools to the question: “If there existed a superior being who possessed the 
supernatural qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality and 
incomprehensibility how would he/she act differently from us, and would these 
differences be knowable?” (1983 pvii).   However these characteristics are 
defined in ways that are difficult to relate to mainstream theology, for example 
omnipotence is defined as the ability to continue moving when the opponents in 
a game must stop plus the ability to delay (1983 p7) and incomprehensibility is 
defined as the ability to play mixed strategies (1983 p7).  Any translation of 
theology into the language of rational choice economics will involve some 
stretching, but the definitions chosen limit the applicability of Brams’ results.   
 
Turning to the religion literature, divine action is one of the least satisfactory 
areas of contemporary theology (for instance Saunders 2002), perhaps because 
theologians have been reluctant to draw on the insights of economics and other 
social sciences which study rational action.   Recent discussions in the 
philosophy of religion (e.g. Alston 1988) suggest that the analogy with human 
action offers rich possibilities for developing our understanding of divine action.  
Salvation is a sensible place to begin economic analysis of divine action, as it is 
central to Christian theology and the pattern for much other divine activity.     
 
This paper applies rational choice theory to divine action, and in particular the 
salvation contract offered by God and human response. The first contribution is 
to build a tractable model of divine action which yields a number of testable 
predictions. The second contribution is to the philosophy of economics, 
suggesting how a rational choice account relates to conventional theological 
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accounts of divine action.  Thirdly the analysis highlights some limitations of an 
economic approach to God,  and is a contribution to the renewal of 
interdisciplinary conversation between economics and theology represented by 
Oslington (2003) or Schweiker and Matthewes (2004). 
 
2) MODEL 
 
(a) Setup 
Consider a household production economy with many individuals i=1...n, each 
with an endowment of factors of production x ik   k=1...q  and  an endowment of 
time ti.   Individuals can produce j=1..m commodities using factors and time to 
according to the production functions    zj = f ( xkj, tj )  k=1...q. Individuals derive 
utility from commodities according to Ui(z1...zj…zm).  Utility functions are 
assumed to be increasing, concave and homothetic.  Endowments and utility 
functions are heterogonous across  individuals.    
 
In equilibrium individuals are exchanging factors, employing labour, allocating 
time and producing commodities to maximise utility.    With equilibrium factor 
prices p and wage w, full income of an individual is Yi = ∑
k
 xki pki + ti w  and 
maximised utility Ui( zˆ ). 
 
Now introduce God who has a utility function UG (z1…zi … zn) which registers 
God’s satisfaction with the choices of the i=1...n individuals.   This divine utility 
function is assumed to be known to all individuals, consistent with the Christian 
doctrine of revelation1.  For simplicity it assumed to be separable, allowing us to 
focus on God’s valuation of the bundle of a representative individual UG(zi). It is 
assumed to be concave, but not necessarily increasing in each commodity.  
God desires that humans enjoy the good things of creation, represented by UG 
(zi) being increasing in these good things, but some commodities will be 
frowned upon by God (the reader can compose his or her own examples) with 
UG(zi) decreasing in these2.  The important point for the analysis is that divine 
                                                 
1 The nature of religious knowledge and its acquisition are complex issues in the 
philosophy of religious.  Some insightful comments from an economic perspective are 
offered by Montgomery (1996).  
2 The form of God’s utility function is left open here.   It may be possible through 
revealed preference analysis to gain some information about God’s preferences. If the 
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and human valuations of bundles diverge, following the Christian doctrine of the 
fall.    
 
The God of the Christian scriptures is not merely a passive observer of human 
choices, but intervenes in human affairs offering salvation to those who repent 
and have faith.  Faith cannot be observed, but is indicated by individuals 
conforming their choices to God’s will as expressed in the divine utility function. 
The salvation contract God offers is as follows. If an individual chooses a bundle 
of commodities which is approved by God, which means generating utility for 
God above some threshold level: 
 (1)   UG(zi)≥ θ.   
then individual i receives salvation. 
Salvation denoted s is a discrete good, either gained or not gained, and yields 
utility Ui(s).   This utility is assumed to be finite, and need not just be afterlife 
rewards although it may include these.  
 
The human problem is whether to rearrange one’s life to take advantage of the 
offer of salvation. Let the best commodity bundle for individual i which satisfies 
the salvation constraint UG(zi) ≥ θ be denoted iz~ .  The individual will choose 
salvation if and only if the value of salvation exceeds the opportunity cost of 
salvation, which is the difference between the values of the unconstrained and 
constrained bundles: 
   (2)  Ui(s)  ≥  Ui( izˆ ) - Ui( iz~ ).   
Examples of unconstrained and constrained bundles are given in figure 1.  The 
unconstrained bundle izˆ  is the point of tangency between the budget constraint 
pxi + wti ≤ p x i+ wti and indifference curve Ui(zi), in the usual fashion.  The 
constrained bundle must satisfy UG(xi) ≥ θ as well as the budget constraint. 
Figure 1 shows a linear salvation constraint where commodity 2 is positively 
valued by God, and commodity 1 is frowned upon, so the bundle must lie on or 
below UG(xi) = θ if the individual is to attain salvation.   The constrained bundle 
is marked iz~  and generates utility Ui( iz~ ).  The individual then compares the 
opportunity cost of salvation with the value of salvation in (2) and chooses 
accordingly.  
                                                                                                                                                      
Christian scriptures are regarded as a record of divine activity then we have data on 
divine choices in many different situations.   
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The divine problem has two parts.   First, God must set the optimal salvation 
threshold. The number of individuals saved is decreasing in θ, but the 
consumption reallocations of these saved towards what God prefers is 
increasing in θ, so a rational maximizing God will have to balance these effects3. 
In calculating optimal θ God will have to take account of changes in the 
consumption bundles induced by the price effects of the salvation mechanism.  
The salvation mechanism will increase demand for the commodities God 
values, increasing their relative prices and inducing individuals  to substitute 
away from these commodities.  
 
The second part of the divine problem is checking the optimal salvation contract 
is gainful.  Jesus’ sacrifice which opened the way to salvation was a costly act 
for God, and a rational God must check that the divine utility gains from offering 
 the contract exceed this cost which will be denoted C.  The sacrifice will be 
worthwhile for God if   
 (3) UG( iz~ 1… iz~  n) - UG( z 1… z n) > C 
Throughout the paper it will be assumed that this condition is satisfied.  
  
(b) Why Doesn’t God Save Everyone? 
The first prediction of the model is that God will not offer a salvation contract 
where everyone is saved.   If God sets θ=0 then all individuals receive s, but 
there would be no rearrangement of bundles and hence no utility benefits for 
God to balance the lump sum cost C.  This cannot be an equilibrium.  On the 
other hand setting θ=∞ would mean no individuals choose s, and no 
rearrangements, and this cannot be an equilibrium.  Thus θ will be set between 
these extremes, with the value depending on the forms of the divine and human 
utility functions and endowments.  Some, but not all individuals are predicted to 
choose salvation, and this is consistent with both the scriptures and observation. 
 
(c) Who is Saved? 
Further predictions can be made about which individuals are likely to be saved. 
Utility functions differ between individuals and those whose utility functions are 
                                                 
3 Note that God in the model does not care directly about souls saved but about the 
actions of individuals.    
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closely aligned to God’s incur only minimal utility losses in rearranging their 
bundles to gain salvation are more likely to choose salvation.  
 
Endowments of factors and time also differ randomly between individuals.  
Those with low incomes are more likely to choose salvation because their 
opportunity cost of salvation is less than high income individuals. In figure 1 the 
income consumption path for the unconstrained individual is flatter than the 
divine salvation constraint, implying the difference between unconstrained and 
constrained utility increases with income, as shown in figure 2.  Unless this is so 
the salvation constraint cannot bind, no individuals will be saved, and the model 
is degenerate.    Figure 3 shows the relationship implied by figure 2 between the 
probability of salvation and full income for an individual with preferences 
randomly drawn from the set of possible preferences4.  God here is a God of the 
poor, as suggested by certain strands of Christian theology, but not exclusively 
so because both preferences as well as endowments are randomly distributed5.  
 
Across time,  salvation would become more attractive in bad economic times as 
the opportunity cost of salvation falls.  Thus the model predicts religious revivals 
will typically occur during economic downturns6. 
  
(d) Conversion and Apostasy 
                                                 
4 Varying assumptions about the divine utility function yields different relationships 
between salvation and income.  For instance if all commodities are positively valued by 
God the divine constraint in figure 1 would be downward sloping with salvation above it. 
 This implies the gap between unconstrained and constrained utility falls as income 
rises, so higher income individuals would be more likely to be saved. So a harsh God 
who frowns on consumption of some commodities is a God of the poor, while a softer 
God who disapproves of nothing is a God of the rich. 
   
5 The model in Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975 p36) predicts a positive relationship between 
income and demand for religious commodities, flowing from their assumption that 
religious commodities are normal goods.   The empirical support offered in the paper 
and elsewhere is mixed.  Iannaccone  (1998 p1472-4) finds no clear relationship 
between income and church attendance, although church attendance may not be a 
good indicator of salvation.  A weak relationship would be consistent with the 
complicating effect of randomness in utility functions on the income- salvation 
relationship. 
 
6 An extension of the model which considered the age of the individual would predict 
that the likelihood of accepting the salvation contract increases with age as the 
opportunity cost of rearrangements to obtain salvation decreases as death approaches, 
and the afterlife portion of the s remains the same.   
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Consider an individual with an income close to Yθ in figure 2, who is on the edge 
of accepting or rejecting the salvation contract.  A small shock to endowments 
or prices will lead to a large discrete change in the consumption bundle.   
Salvation is thus not predicted to be like other commodities which will be 
smoothly substituted by all individuals as economic conditions change.  This 
accords with observations of the dramatic nature of religious conversion and 
apostasy.  
 
(e) Moderating Effect of Salvation  
A saved individual’s life is predicted to be more stable than an unsaved 
individual’s the sense that the consumption choices will be less responsive to 
shocks. The saved individual will also be less greedy in the sense that marginal 
utility of income is lower, as illustrated in figure 2.   These are straightforward 
consequences of the LeChatelier principle that a constrained equilibrium will be 
less responsive to parameter changes than an unconstrained maximum.   
 
(f) The Unsaved 
Paradoxically, the more effective is the salvation mechanism the more it will turn 
the unsaved away from what God prefers.  Individuals choosing salvation will 
force up the prices of inputs into commodities God prefers be consumed, so that 
unsaved individuals will substitute away from commodities God values to those 
God frowns upon. 
 
 
3) LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC MODELLING 
The analysis raises some issues for rational choice modelling of divine action: 
   
(a)  Free Will and Determinism 
A difficulty with applying rational choice tools to God is that mainstream 
Christian theology holds God to be omnipotent, making the specification of 
constraints awkward.  The present model gets around this difficulty by having 
God interact with individuals whose preferences are respected, consistent with 
the Christian doctrine of free will.   
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However this creates another difficulty because Christian theology also holds 
that God is omniscient, and moreover has created humans with their utility 
functions.  If this is so then why would God not create utility functions which  
match God’s, generating maximum possible divine utility without the need for 
salvation contracts.   
 
The analysis thus raises in a particularly sharp way the question of whether 
humans have free will in any meaningful sense, and can reasonably be held 
responsible by God for their choices7.  It is not an easy issue, and one which 
theologians have grappled with for centuries.  Standard accounts of the problem 
(e.g Zagzebski 1991) take freedom to be the ability of an agent to choose 
otherwise, and point out the logical incompatibility of this with prior knowledge of 
the agent’s choice by an infallible agent such as God.  However this is not the 
only possible view of freedom – another view (e.g. Wolf 1990) is that freedom is 
choosing for good reasons.  In our rational choice account of action preferences 
in conjunction with agent rationality constitute good reasons, and so the 
knowledge of or creation of these by God facilitates rather than negates human 
freedom.  Predictability of the agents choice  is  perfectly consistent with 
freedom.  And if free humans are also responsible for their choices.  The issue 
is not clear-cut, but one all economic modelling of divine and human choices 
has to deal with. 
 
(b) Beliefs and Intentions 
Christian theology suggests that God cares not just about observed behaviour, 
but the beliefs and intentions of agents.  The model of salvation in this paper 
bypasses this issue, but more sophisticated ways of dealing with beliefs and 
intentions within rational choice models are needed.     
 
(c) Scarcity  
All commodities in the model of this paper are scarce,  but Christian theology 
seems to envisage immaterial commodities not subject to scarcity.  Robert 
Fogel (1999) recently introduced the idea of spiritual capital to economics to 
deal with this issue, and Klamer (2004) the concept of non-scarce common 
                                                 
7 It is a general problem with the theory of rational choice, as discussed by Allen 
(2000). 
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goods. Modelling of divine human interactions would be enriched by considering 
such commodities. 
 
(d) Conversion 
Another difficulty is that conversion is portrayed in mainstream Christian 
theology as a radical change, which does not sit easily with the economist’s 
usual insistence on fixed preferences.  Conversion seems to be something more 
radical even than the discontinuous switch from the unconstrained to the 
constrained bundles portrayed in this paper.   
 
(e) Church 
The communal dimension of the Christian faith is missing from the model.  The 
recent economics of religion literature has modeled church as a club good (e.g. 
Iannaccone, 1992) but deliberately avoided the salvation implications of church 
participation. 
 
 
 4) CONCLUSION 
This paper has applied rational choice tools to the content of religion, and in 
particular to divine action in offering salvation and human response.   Although a 
very simple model, it generates a number of testable predictions consistent with 
casual observation of religious behaviour.   It also offers a challenge to empirical 
researchers to formally test these predictions as better data on the economic 
dimensions of religious behaviour becomes available. 
 
Applying rational choice tools to God is a way of exploring the limits of economic 
analysis; its strengths, weaknesses and explanatory domain.  It is hoped that 
modelling divine action in this way will contribute to a renewal of interdisciplinary 
conversation between economics and theology, to the enrichment of both.  
Such interdisciplinary conversation between other sciences (such as cosmology 
and evolutionary biology) and theology has been extremely fruitful in recent 
decades. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
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Figure 2 –Income and the Salvation Constraint 
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